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Projections of large, even astounding, infrastructure "needs" are
commonplace. According to these projections of what is known as the
third deficit, the nation has undersaved in its public capital accounts as
it has undersaved in its overall national income accounts, and major
reinvestments are required to get back on track.
While the share of national output devoted to public capital invest-
ment has undoubtedly declined, it is another matter to argue that this
investment share must be quickly recouped. Moreover, the notion of
infrastructure "needs" is inherently uneconomic--who needs what,
who is willing to pay what price? Hence this paper examines these
needs from an economist’s perspective, not so much to assess them as
to ask who might pay for any added infrastructure investment and
under what payment scheme. The paper is, in a word, about public
sector payment schemes, not about quantitative amounts of investment.
It makes sense to confine attention to capital needs that are truly
public: anything other would fall in the domain of the private sector and
be the responsibility of private investors. The subject can be further
narrowed to the public capital needs of state and local governments, for
the simple reason that the federal government does not really make
many direct domestic public capital investments in the United States.
Apart from pork barrel dam projects, which are on no one’s short list of
national needs, the federal role is to give grants to state or local
governments for capital purchases, and the main policy suggestions
involve changes in the structure of these grants.
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The paper uncovers many instances where present laws provide
incentives that seem deficient from a social point of view. For the most
part, these deficiencies are simply identified and explained. No attempt
is made to discuss why the incentives or disincentives were created in
the first place. Such discussion would prove very valuable in making
policy changes, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
The paper goes through some normative considerations on how
various types of public capital spending ought to be financed from the
standpoint of orthodox canons of public finance. Each section then asks
whether these normative considerations call for any major policy
changes at either the federal or state and local level. The last section of
the paper collects the main policy suggestions.
Types of Infrastructure Capital
The types of incentives that should be used for state and local public
capital spending depend on why the public capital is desirable in the
first place--whether this capital serves allocation or distribution pur-
poses, whether spillovers occur, whether user fees can easily be as-
sessed. Since different types of capital vary widely on these grounds, it
makes sense to discuss the types separately. Broadly speaking, three
types may be discussed:
Local allocation: This type of public capital serves local needs
where minimal interjurisdictional spillovers and minimal distri-
butional implications are found.
Local allocation with spillovers: Like local allocation except with
benefit spillovers from one jurisdiction to another.
Local allocation and distribution: Now public capital serves goals
that importantly affect the distribution of income in the long run.
In distinguishing these types, two notions are particularly impor-
tant. The first, interjurisdictional benefit spillovers, can be defined very
simply. When community A builds a public facility, benefits spill over
into community B, when some of its households are better off; examples
include public roads or clean water and air treatment facilities.
The second, whether the public facility has long-term distributional
implications, is trickier. By this, I do not mean that paying for the public
facility has distributional implications: obviously any payment scheme
will shift charges from one taxpayer to another and have short-term
distributional implications. Rather it implies that the public facility
promotes human investment and enables recipients to improve their
long-run income prospects. The main examples of this occur in educa-
tion, either local public schools or state university systems. HealthHOW SHOULD PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE BE FINANCED? 225
facilities would qualify as well; I will not discuss them because in the
United States today the financing of health care facilities is by and large
private, supported by massive federal insurance schemes that have their
own special problems.
Local Allocation
When public capital satisfies only local needs with no particular
distributional implications, orthodox microeconomic reasoning says it is
efficient to provide the service with user fees. Were this not done,
taxpayers would be taxed on a basis that is only coincidentally correlated
with their own taste for the service. Economic inefficiency is minimized
in switching to a regime where all consumers equate their marginal
benefits with marginal costs, which then implies that the sum of
marginal benefits equals the marginal physical costs of production. The
classic example where such a scheme could prove workable is a public
park system.
Even here, of course, the example might not be perfect. For one
thing, while consumption of services from public parks cannot be said to
be importantly related to future income prospects, some desire to make
sure all consumers regardless of income get to consume some amount
might warrant a general consumption subsidy. For another, the public
service in question might be a so-called natural monopoly with falling
average costs; again a fixed cost subsidy would be warranted. But these
exceptions only moderate the degree to which user fees can pay for the
cost of the facility; some user fees are still almost always an efficient
financing device for this type of public service.
Another predominantly local service without distributional impli-
cations involves that new plague on most large cities--local landfills.
Landfill costs are rising rapidly, and many localities are facing enormous
capital expenditures simply to continue burying their trash. Many local
politicians are toying with mandatory recycling schemes, and user fees
would be a nice complement to recycling and a way of paying some or
all of the landfill costs. Local governments could make households pay
according to the volume of their own solid waste, by buying specially
designated garbage bags if necessary. Confronted with this price,
households will be more likely to voluntarily recycle newspapers, yard
wastes, and the like. The city gains a source of revenue to pay for solid
waste disposal, and the marginal benefits and marginal costs of landfill
expansion can be brought into equality.
The main problem of moving, to a regime where households actually
pay for trash disposal is enforcement--what is to prevent households
from just dumping their garbage? One thing that might prevent house-
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assessing user fees now before the problem is serious and land becomes
even scarcer, the enforcement problem would be less (it would have
been less still, had user fees been in effect for the past thirty years).
Beyond that, if communities have a serious enforcement problem, the
best solution may be to pick up garbage without charge and pay for
recycling. Such a scheme is costly, but it at least encourages conserva-
tion and recycling by maintaining the proper relative price structure.
Some types of local allocation goods have no feasible way to impose
user fees--police cars, local streets, and perhaps the fixed-cost portion
of natural monopoly public services. The American way is to pay for
these costs by the local property tax. Without spillover benefits, calls for
grants from higher levels of government are unwarranted. The services
are local, the benefits are local, and the payments should be local.
Hence the major problem with present arrangements seems to be
the public service areas such as landfills, where marginal costs are high
and localities are facing large capital outlays. The obvious solution is to
charge user fees. These fees might be fairly high, because of high
marginal cost. While the high user fees may be unpopular, the culprit is
not the idea of a user fee itself but the fact that many cities have allowed
the problem to fester so long, charging households far too little to use
landfills and encouraging "waste" and overuse, and now find them-
selves in a bind. The circumstances are regrettable, but for the solution,
better late than never.
Local Allocation with Spillovers
The next step is to extend the analysis by assuming that benefits
from the public service are partly internal and partly external, realized in
other communities. Prime examples are national roads, wastewater
treatment, or clean air facilities.
Again if feasible, the user fee solution is optimal, and this time it
even solves the spillover problem. Suppose a road is being built from
city A to city B. Assume either that fixed costs are minimal or that they
can be amortized into the toll. This toll can be set to equal the marginal
cost of use of the road, presumably more for heavy trucks, again with
the property that every user equates marginal benefits to marginal costs.
(Small, Winston and Evans 1989 discuss a set of such schemes.)
Spillovers are dealt with automatically because if some driver desiring to
use the road happens to be from out of state, that driver automatically
pays. Out-of-state consumers of goods shipped by truck also pay.
But things are not so easy if user fees are costly to assess. Urban
beltways might fall into this category because while toll gates can
physically be constructed, the stop-and-go time loss can mount up (as
any motorist skirting Chicago can attest). New technologies to deal withHOW SHOULD PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE BE FINANCED? 227
this problem may be available, but until such technologies become
widely feasible, various other schemes can achieve rough justice.
One scheme, following the classic prescription for the spillover
problem, is for jurisdictions simply to join together to deal with
spillovers, using regional special districts to conduct the Same functions.
Many large cities have such regional authorities for subways, ports,
power, water, and public schools. The authority can plan and operate
the service and assess fees that correspond to user benefits, and no
higher government intervention is necessary.
Should these regional authorities not prove feasible, the higher
government--hereafter the federal government--can step in and pro-
vide matching grants for the service. Ideally the federal matching rate
should correspond to the percentage share of out-of-jurisdiction bene-
fits, or approximately the share of out-of-jurisdiction use. Superficially
many existing federal capital grant programs appear to be patterned
after this rationale, but most of these existing federal matching grants
have matching ratios that are 80 or 90 percent federal, 10 or 20 percent
state. For the interstate highway system, for example, the federal
matching rate is 90 percent and Department of Transportation (DOT)
estimates of interstate travellers indicate that on the average interstate
highway only 30 percent of the traffic is out of state. The typical state
receiving a 90 percent subsidy when the external use ratio is only on the
order of 30 percent will obviously expand use of the matching grants,
with the consequence that the federal capital grant must be, as all now
are, capped to limit use. But capping means no federal spending
incentive at the margin, which in turn means that non-user-fee-financed
federal roads are under-provided despite the generous initial federal
matching.
The efficient solution is to return funds to states in the form of
uncapped or open-ended 30 percent federal matching grants rather than
capped 90 percent federal matching grants. The recent DOT report
(1990) calls for part of this remedy--lower federal matching shares---but
does not advocate removing the caps. I have previously estimated that
were both changes made, total highway spending would be increased,
economic efficiency would be improved, and the federal government
would save money, all by noticeable amounts (Gramlich 1990). The key
point is to alter federal grant incentives such that states have a price
incentive to provide the right amount of highway spending, rather than
to put a quantity limit on the grant.
Similar comments can be made about virtually all federal categorical
capital grants. Inframarginal federal matching shares are higher than the
likely out-of-state benefit spillover rate, the grants are capped, and
capital is under-provided. The same is true of categorical grants in both
Canada and Australia--the problem seems endemic in a federal struc-228 Edward M. Gramlich
ture. Exactly why the problem is endemic is unclear, perhaps because
politicians realize greater gains in dispersing (and being lobbied for) a
few large grants than many small ones. But whatever the cause,
remedying this structure of matching rates would go a long way to
providing proper subnational government spending incentives and
cutting back on federal grant spending. To the extent that states would
now have to pay more on average for facilities, they would have even
more monetary incentive to find and levy efficient tolls, or user fees that
are related to the true use of facilities.
A few topics require special comment. Airport capital spending is now
financed by a federal ticket tax returned to localities in the form of capped
80 percent federal grants. Airport use studies are not as commonly cited,
but surely 80 percent is again too high. If airports were given control of
their own user fees, or if grants were made open-ended at a lower federal
matching rate, airport spending could be encouraged and federal net
spending could again be cut. To the extent airports need more funds to pay
for their facilities, they could make stronger use of landing fees, especially
at peak-load times. Landing fees would have the added advantage of
cutting peak-load airport use and the need for airport expansions. Price
signals can be a powerful force if used properly, and they really have not
been for either highway or airport grants.
Efficient solutions are available for both highways and airports
because it is possible to finance most capital needs with user fees. In
other cases where the user fee approach is costly or difficult, financing
questions become more difficult, but the same comments apply to
federal capital grants. One such grant is for wastewater treatment,
where it is costly to monitor the volume of household use. These
facilities will presumably have to be financed by state or local general
taxes, though federal matching rates should again be lowered and the
grants uncapped. Clean air legislation is moving in the welcome
direction of greater use of price incentives through resalable emission
permits (Tietenberg 1988), but it would again make sense to finance
some of the large capital costs by open-ended federal grants at low
matching rates.
The bottom line is that while capital needs may be large, the real
problem is that the country simply has not designed proper price
incentive schemes. The preferred solution is to restructure, but not
necessarily increase, federal grants in combination with much more
vigorous use of user incentives at the state or local level.
Local Allocation and Distribution
Complicating matters again, now assume that whether or not
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long-run distributional needs. The standard examples are local public
schools and state university systems.
The question of local public schools has always proved key in such
discussions, partly because schooling does promote long-run economic
opportunity for the recipients, partly because schooling is simply so
large. In recent years, purchases for public schools have accounted for
one-third of all state and local purchases in ~he United States.
Two basic democratic assumptions dictate the financing problems
of public schools:
Public schools are maintained and operated by local school
boards, keeping the power of determining curriculum and so
forth close to the people.
As a matter of democratic right, public schools are free of charge.
Since no form of user fee is possible, and since the main local tax
in the United States is the property tax, public schools are
essentially financed by local property taxes.
But they are not necessarily entirely financed by local property
taxes. As is by now well-known, since communities vary widely by
property wealth, a common-rate property tax applied across all commu-
nities will lead to widely varying levels of expenditure per pupil. Putting
it differently, the tax price of a unit of educational services varies widely
by community--higher in poor communities and lower in rich commu-
nities. Many state courts have argued that this varying tax price violates
the "equal access to education" provision and have mandated states to
come up with what are known as "district power equalization plans" to
reduce the intercommunity variation in the tax price of public schooling.
It might first be noted that while the district power equalization
problem has arisen for local public schools, in principle it could also arise
for any of the non-user-fee local services discussed earlier. One differ-
ence is that public schooling is perceived to be the pathway to eliminat-
ing income differences in the long run, more so than, say, local streets
or police cars.
A second matter arising is how states might correct unequal tax
prices. The answer is once again by open-ended matching grants, where
the state matching rate varies inversely with community taxable wealth.
Feldstein (1975) worked out a simple model to show how this could be
done: the state matching share is made inversely dependent on com-
munity wealth so that the full effect of wealth on education spending
averages out to be zero across communities. Like the federal categorical
matching grants discussed earlier, these state grants must be open-
ended to influence tax prices at the margin. But now the matching rate
is not related to benefit spillovers, as before, but to community wealth.230 Edward M. Gramlich
While public schooling is largely viewed as a matter between states
and localities, the federal government enters in as well:
The federal government has a limited amount of Chapter One
grants for underprivileged school districts; as usual, they are
capped, with high federal matching shares.
The federal income tax permits deductibility of local property
taxes, which works against power equalization since many more
taxpayers itemize deductions in wealthy than in poor communi-
ties.
The appropriate policy toward education expenditures depends on
one’s goals. If the goal is simply to raise spending on public schooling,
federal policies might be left unchanged and state schooling grants,
matching and uncapped, should be provided to all schools. If, on the
other hand, the goal is to improve poor schooling in underprivileged
areas, a more complex set of remedies is called for:
Federal tax deductibility should be abolished, as a fundamentally
disequalizing measure. A large federal revenue gain would result
from this change, and some of the funds might even be devoted
to other education measures (Gramlich 1985).
Federal Chapter One grants to poor schools should be reformed
as suggested above, by removing the cap and lowering the federal
matching rate.
State power equalization plans must be substantially strength-
ened until they eliminate much of the variation in local tax prices.
The other important type of public spending with long-run distri-
butional implications is higher education, operated mainly by state
governments. Here the states can impose user fees, in the form of
tuition charges, and no reason exists in principle why these user fees
cannot cover the full cost of higher education. No state charges user fees
nearly high enough to cover full costs, but some do assess full cost user
fees on out-of-state students.
Whether user fees are full cost or not, higher education has become
very expensive, and this just pushes the financing question down a
rung. That question now becomes either how state legislatures can
afford higher education (if user fees do not cover the full cost), or how
families can afford it (if user fees cover a major share of the cost).
Families have basically two options--prepayment or postpayment.
The tried and true prepayment scheme is for families to save up and pay
for tuition. Since even many high-income families cannot manage to do
that, some states are now experimenting with forced saving schemes,
whereby a family would buy a contract when the prospective student is
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varies inversely with the interest rate and positively with the anticipated
rate of growth of tuition. Any number of technical problems may
emerge with such plans (Lehman 1990), and it remains to be seen
whether they can resolve the financing problem satisfactorily.
The tried and true postpayment scheme is for student loans, though
these have at least two problems:
High default rates.
The possibility that high payment obligations constrain the career
choices of graduates.
Schemes that would make payback amounts income-related have
also been discussed, but these too are still untested (Reischauer 1988).
As earlier, present payment schemes operate on top of a small Pell grant
federal program that provides grant assistance to very poor students,
but Pell grants have not been, and are not likely to be, much help for
students with incomes above the very lowest levels.
Of all the financing problems, then, those involving education seem
clearly to be the most serious. At the elementary and secondary level,
exactly how serious depends on whether the problem is felt to involve
education spending in general, or just the education received by
low-income children. Even if just the latter, state power equalization
plans have to be significantly expanded, and the federal revenues that
could be saved by eliminating local tax deductibility provide one
possible revenue source. At the higher education level, the needs will be
large too, and here new schemes might be required to help families pay
their user fees.
Timing Issues
The discussion thus far has been timeless--concerned with which
groups should pay how much for what facility. At this point timing
questions need to be considered.
Whether the project involves local allocation goods, local allocation
with spillovers, or distributional implications as well, the basic norma-
tive longitudinal principle is the same as the normative cross-sectional
principle--those who benefit should pay. Under this principle, capital
expenditures should be financed by long-term bonds with maturities
close to the natural life of the structure. User fees or taxes should then
pay annual depreciation expenses plus the interest and principal on the
bonds. When the bonds are retired, new ones can be floated and the
structures rebuilt.
Many states and localities have provisions in their constitutions that
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spending. By this standard, states and localities seem to follow fairly
conservative spending practices; durable goods purchases and construc-
tion expenditures typically run about 15 percent of total state and local
spending, while the overall general government surplus or deficit is
typically close to zero (apart from the large, but independent, cash
surpluses of employee trust funds).
One might carry the argument over to the federal level: if state and
local capital spending should be bond-financed, why not federal capital
grants? In principle, they should be. In practice, to do so would raise the
ugly specter of federal capital budgeting, something that horrifies most
Washington budgeteers. So many capital budgeting questions can be
found at the federal level what to do about depreciation on defense
hardware or grants, on human investment programs, funded or un-
funded social security liabilities, funded or unfunded saving and loan
deposit liabilities, and so forth-~that it would be impossible to raise the
capital grant issue without getting into all the rest of the capital
budgeting problems, many of which do not have clear solutions. Since
federal capital grants to state and local governments are now only about
4 percent of federal spending, this would be a case of having the capital
grant tail wag the federal budget dog. Moreover, federal policy-makers
have assured that the federal budget deficit is much greater than federal
capital grants--if it makes anybody feel better, these grants can easily be
considered to be bond-financed right now.
To summarize these timing issues, no need or reason exists to
change anything. One can make a strong normative argument for bond
financing of capital spending at the state and local level, and generally
present institutions are set up to accommodate the argument. One could
make a theoretical argument for the same treatment at the national level,
and while institutions are not set up to accommodate tl~e argument,
actual practice has more than provided the requisite bond financing.
Trust Funds
Both at the federal and at the state and local levels, much infrastruc-
ture investment is financed by dedicated trust funds. Governments
often devote, say, gas tax revenues to a trust fund to finance highway
construction. At the federal level, five such trust funds are in opera-
tion for airports, highways, aquatic resources, harbors, and inland
waterways.
These federal trust funds have been the focus of much discussion
because all five are now running surpluses, amounting to about $2
billion a year. Lobbyists for the affected type of investment have made
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Gramm-Rudman-Hollings-type spending limitations would not con-
strain spending. A set of deeper considerations also exists about why
dedicated federal trust funds should have been established in the first
place.
From a normative point of view, trust funds do seem to be a useful
way to tie marginal benefits to marginal costs when dedicated taxes or
user fees can be assessed and when no externalities are present. In this
pure case, one budgeting sub-constraint is that the user fee revenue
must cover spending over time, a sub-constraint that can be ensured by
the trust fund arrangement. Even in this case, however, no good reason
is evident for taking the trust fund off budget, at least if the federal
budget is supposed to measure total federal spending.
But suppose externalities are present. On one side, it might be that
the type of spending under consideration contains enough external
benefits that a subsidy should be provided. The more relevant case for
federal trust funds is on the other side. Say a tax, the federal gas tax for
example, is assessed to pay for highways and devoted to the highway
trust fund (as now). But in part this tax might also be assessed for
general energy conservation purposes, or because it is viewed as an
efficient way to finance overall federal non-highway spending. Then
either the gas tax must be split between the highway trust fund and
general revenues, or the highway trust fund should run at a substantial
surplus. The debate inspired by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan suggests
that it is so hard for the political world to understand why a trust fund
should ever have a surplus (even when, as in the case of Social Security,
a perfectly good reason exists), that the trust fund mode may become an
impediment to sound fiscal policy.
That is not the only problem with the trust fund mode. For reasons
that are not entirely clear, four of these trust funds--for airports,
highways, inland waterways, and harbors--contain provisions whereby
some of the spending is financed by general revenues (Congressional
Budget Office 1989). In the case of highways, 15 percent of the spending
is so financed, for airports one-half, for harbors two-thirds, and for
inland waterways almost all spending. This arrangement seems to
achieve the worst of both worlds: the subsidy encourages overspending,
and the phony surplus energizes lobbyists who argue for still more
spending. The proper remedy would be either to eliminate the trust
fund (in cases where externalities are important), or to make sure that
dedicated taxes or user fees finance all spending (in cases where
externalities are not important).
Of the five federal.trust funds, the fund for aquatic resources is now
in balance; dedicated taxes or fees cover all spending, leaving a minimal
overall surplus or deficit. The funds for airports, inland waterways, and
harbors should be corrected by eliminating the general fund financing234 Edward M. Gramlich
and increasing user fees or dedicated taxes to cover all spending.
Making these changes, and the further changes in matching provisions
suggested above, would lower the overall federal deficit by about $5
billion a year. The Department of Transportation (1990) also suggested
an expanded use of trust funds and dedicated user fees for the Coast
Guard and railroads. Putting these operations in trust funds, with their
own designated source of finance, could whittle the federal deficit by
another $2 billion a year.
The case for the highway trust fund is the most interesting. The
matching provisions should be changed as in the other trust funds. As
for revenues, it would take an increase in the federal gas tax of about
$.08 a gallon, for $8 billion, to cover all federal highway and transit
spending. Were the trust fund mode preserved, this would be the
minimum added revenue requirement. But, as mentioned above, one
could easily argue for a higher federal gas tax increase on the basis of
overall budget or conservation needs. In this case the easiest thing is
probably just to get rid of the highway trust fund, or at a minimum
redraw the treaty on how much of the gas tax is devoted to the trust
fund.
Constraints
In addition to the matching provisions discussed above, federal
grants often come with a number of other strings attached. For example,
it has long been argued that federal capital grants suffer by being just
that--grants for capital construction instead of grants for services
provided (Schultze 1974). Various constraints also are placed on the
types of user fees the recipient authority can assess. Although some of
these constraints have been relaxed lately, it would seem to make sense
to remove most of the constraints that force lower levels of government
to use grants only for capital purchases or new construction, or to raise
money in certain ways. Why not let states and localities decide for
themselves how money is best raised and spent?
The highway trust fund contains an additional constraint--apart
from bridges, highway grants cannot be used to finance construction of
toll roads. In recent years, provisions added to the basic highway
legislation have lifted this restriction in selected cases (ironically, with 35
percent federal matching in these cases), but why not just lift the
provision universally? States have to finance their own share of highway
expenses; why not simply let them decide whether to finance through a
toll, a gas tax, or some other scheme?HOW SHOULD PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE BE FINANCED? 235
Constraints could make sense when they achieve valid public
purposes. As a general rule, that condition does not appear satisfied for
most constraints on present-day federal grants.
Policy Changes
The previous discussion has compared the normative arrangements
one might set up to deal with infrastructure financing with existing
arrangements. Several important policy changes emerge from that
comparison. Many of these suggestions are quite radical, compared with
those usually made in Washington budget discussions. The justification
for making radical suggestions is that even if they are not adopted, it is
still helpful to know the directions in which changes should be made. Of
course it should be understood that any steps in the right direction are
just that--intermediate or piecemeal improvements are certainly to be
welcomed.
Federal Level
Perhaps the most important suggestion at the federal level is that
the trust funds that now finance many of the capital grants for
infrastructure investment should be reorganized.
All spending for the relevant function should be financed by user
fees or designated taxes; the general revenue subsidies should be
ended.
Grants should be altered, with much lower federal matching rates
(reflecting actual use shares) and with the caps eliminated, so that
spending is subsidized appropriately at the margin and lower
levels of government have more pressure to levy efficient user
charges.
Restrictions on how funds are raised or whether they are used for
capital or maintenance expenses should generally be eliminated.
In some cases, such as the highway trust fund, either the gas tax
should be increased enough to generate a surplus in the fund, the
gas tax should be shared between the fund and general revenues,
or the trust fund arrangement should be abolished.
The next set of issues involves federal provisions that affect educa-
tion:
Again, those matching grants devoted to education and training
should carry lower federal matching rates and be made open-
ended.
Depending on objectives, the federal tax deduction for state and236 Edward M. Gramlich
local taxes might be altered. This deduction might be left alone if
one’s goal is simply to raise spending on education, but if one’s
goal is to let poor districts consume public education on more
equal terms with rich districts, the tax deduction should be
curbed or eliminated.
State Level
The most important policy improvement at the state level is to
enhance power equalization formulas so that rich and poor districts can
in fact consume public education on more equal terms. Improvements in
state power equalization schemes would satisfy both the goals of
increasing and of equalizing spending on public education: mainly they
should increase spending by poor school districts.
The policy choices for higher education are not so clear. One option
is for states gradually to withdraw from public funding for higher
education, letting state universities raise in-state tuition. Were this to be
done, states would probably have to improve the capital market for
higher education by enhanced prepayment or postpayment schemes.
The other option is for states simply to continue present arrangements,
recognizing that the growing relative cost of higher education will make
such arrangements increasingly expensive.
Finally, states too have trust funds to finance capital spending, and
the general comments would be the same as at the federal level. To the
extent that user fee financing of the relevant type of spending falls short
of efficient levels, it should be enhanced.
Even after such enhancements, it should be noted that the whole
package of measures suggested here is likely to cause an increase in state
government deficits. Certainly altering the federal grant matching rates
in the way suggested and enhanced district power equalization schemes
will work in this direction. This ultimately reflects the fact that compared
to an efficient set of payment schemes, state governments now benefit.
In part, states might restore their budget positions by pressing harder
for user fees that reflect true wear and tear. Beyond that, were there a
desire to hold states harmless, other fiscal adjustments would have to be
made, such as changing the terms of finance for public assistance or
Medicaid, or restoring some general revenue sharing.
Local Level
The main suggestion for local spending involves their new plague--
landfill dumps. The large marginal costs have to be paid. Conservation
and recycling at the household level should be encouraged, not by a set
of mandates, but by a set of user fees that make households pay the trueHOW SHOULD PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE BE FINANCED? 237
cost of their own solid wastes. Such a scheme will both finance a major
part of, and cut down on, the net landfill expenses faced by local
governments.
Conclusion
All of these measures address the basic infrastructure investment
problem now faced in the nation, the shortfall in public capital invest-
ment. But none of them do that by simply "throwing money" at the
problem. The common theme is simply to get the incentives right. When
that happens, aggregate government spending and/or budget deficits
are as likely to go down as they are to go up. Ultimately, the shortfall is
more a deficit in sensible payment schemes than in aggregate money
spending.
References
Congressional Budget Office. 1989. "Statement of W. David Montgomery before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Appropriations." May 11.
Feldstein, Martin S. 1975. "Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in Public Education." The
American Economic Review, March, pp. 75-89.
Gramlich, Edward M. 1985. "The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes." National Tax
Journal, December, pp. 447-65.
--. 1990. A Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Lehman, Jeffrey S. 1990. "The Michigan Educational Trust." Mimeo.
Reischauer, Robert D. 1988. "HELP: A Student Loan Program for the Twenty-First
Century." In Lawrence E. Gladieux, ed., Radical Reform or Incremental Changes? Student
Loan Policy Alternatives for the Federal Government. New York: The College Board.
Schultze, Charles L. 1974. "Sorting Out the Social Grant Programs: An Economist’s
Criteria." The American Economic Review, May, pp. 181-89.
Small, Kenneth A., Clifford Winston and Carol A. Evans. 1989. Road Work: A New Highway
Pricing and Investment Policy. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Tietenberg, Tom. 1988. Environmental and National Resource Economics. 2nd edition. Glen-
ville, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company.
U.S. Department of Transportation. 1990. Moving America: New Directions New Opportu-
nities. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.Rudolph G. Penner*
Having very much enjoyed Edward Gramlich’s paper and finding
little with which to disagree, my comments will elaborate on a problem
that he mentioned only briefly--the problem of capped grants. They
clearly illustrate how difficult it is to design an efficient grant system
when decision-making is severely constrained by political consider-
ations.
Why are federal grants and subsidies, whether for infrastructure or
other purposes, often structured so differently than the ideal grants
described in public finance textbooks? To an economist, the whole
purpose of a grant or subsidy is to affect marginal decisions, but many
federal programs do not do that and are very likely to provide large
lump sum windfalls to someone who would have engaged in exactly the
same activity in the absence of the grant or the subsidy.
The typical patterns alluded to by Gramlich can be described as
follows. A law is passed that creates a large set of people or projects
eligible for assistance. The assistance is described by a formula that
provides a very generous per person or per project grant. The budget
then created for the program is sufficient only to fund a small portion of
the eligible population or projects, and the scarce funds are meted out
by a rationing mechanism that is often controlled by the bureaucracy.
In theory, the project selection process might target scarce funds
precisely on the marginal decision, such that the windfall component,
which we economists know must exist in almost every subsidy system,
is minimized. Frequently, quite the reverse occurs. In credit programs,
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which I know best, the rationing bureaucrat is often judged by the
default rate within his or her programs and, therefore, the scarce funds
are likely to be concentrated on the most creditworthy, eligible borrow-
ers--the ones most likely to be able to borrow in private markets without
government assistance. With regard to physical projects, the grants
often go to the jurisdictions hiring the most able grantsmen or those
mostly likely to perform well on the project--not those who, by some
standard, need it most. During the height of the Great Society grant
system, it was New Haven, Connecticut, that became famous for its
ability to extract money from the federal government, while I never
heard of particularly skillful grantsmen coming from, say, Biloxi, Mis-
sissippi, unless they happened to have moved to New Haven.
So the design of many grants makes little economic sense, the
results are often perverse, and yet, as Gramlich points out, these
perverse characteristics are pervasive. They exist in a wide range of U.S.
programs from housing to highways, and they exist in the federal
systems of most Western democracies.
If something so irrational by economic textbook standards is also so
pervasive, something important must be going on. If the force that is at
work could be identified, a paper might be written called "Why
Gramlich’s Sensible Suggestions Will Never Be Enacted." If a natural
tendency exists for the design of grant systems to be fundamentally
flawed, such a fact is of vital importance to the topic of this conference,
because it severely limits the ability of higher level governments to
induce lower level governments to exploit beneficial spillovers.
In discussing these issues with legislators, it becomes clear quickly
that many results that seem wildly perverse to an economist often seem
quite acceptable, indeed desirable, to legislators. Examples of this
phenomenon will be described later, but first it should be noted that
what Gramlich calls capped grants--I prefer to call them rationed
grants--have an evil effect not noted by Gramlich. Many are very
susceptible to corruption. Indeed, some beg to have money stolen from
them. The recurring cycle of scandals in the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) is, in my judgment, due in no small part to
the rationed nature of grants under most HUD programs. The design of
the subsidy has a two-pronged effect. First, the rationing mechanism
often gives enormous discretionary power to bureaucrats and low-level
political appointees who are susceptible both to bribery and to political
influence from above. Second, the extreme generosity of the per project
grant makes it worthwhile to try to steal from the program.
Why, then, are programs with such bad and inefficient results so
popular with legislators? First, the programs can be very seductive
because they often convey a great deal of discretionary power to the
bureaucracy and to the legislators on the appropriate subcommittees.240 Rudolph G. Penner
People do like having power. But I am one who usually defends
politicians and bureaucrats against the charge that they are power-
hungry people. They are not completely crass. Most truly believe in
public service.
Rationed grants are also politically appealing because they reduce
the uncertainty facing politicians. If Gramlich’s truly open-ended, low
cost-sharing grants were used, the government would be uncertain as to
total costs and the geographical distribution of the funds. Bureaucratic
discretion in determining the latter is often constrained by formula, and
when a generous subsidy is combined with a limited budget, the
government knows with virtual certainty that no more or less than all of
the spending authority will be spent.
The combination of rigid control that reduces uncertainty and
discretionary power that varies from grant to grant is very seductive.
When the advantages of rigid control are put up against the advantages
of economic efficiency, the former generally wins. But perhaps this is
largely because the noneconomist designers of grants are often unaware
that they are inefficient. Since ignorance can be overcome, the situation
most likely can be improved.
It is strongly believed by most that corruption is created by evil
people and not by evil incentives. The media encourage this belief by
focusing investigative reporting on the colorful individuals who become
dishonest, and they seldom look at or understand the program charac-
teristics that really caused the problem.
Noneconomists also have a strong propensity to believe that any
project receiving a federal subsidy would not have been built if the
subsidy program had not existed. The notion of a windfall is very hard
to explain. It is not an intuitively obvious concept. The notion that a
subsidy should be designed to affect decisions at the margin and
minimize windfalls is even harder to explain. In fact, few people
understand what an economist means by "a decision at the margin."
The concept of "the margin" may be ingrained in the soul of economists
but it is understood by few other species.
So, a lot of education is necessary before Gramlich’s ideas have any
hope of implementation and economists must find simpler language
with which to explain these concepts. But this can be done.
One notion beloved by economists seems to have little appeal to
politicians, even when clearly explained. That is the notion of horizontal
equity. In discussions of rationed subsidies, I have often suggested that
it would be fairer to give small per capita subsidies to 100 percent of the
eligible population rather than subsidies ten times as high to 10 percent
of the eligibles. This does not strike a responsive chord at all. The
politician is likely to respond, "Why should I give a small, barely
noticeable subsidy to a whole bunch of people when I can do a really bigDISCUSSION 241
favor for a few--one that might really change their lives?" One could
concoct an economic model that rationalizes this intuition, but it would
be pretty complicated.
Economists’ discussions of user fees and earmarked taxes also pay
too little attention to the difficulty of designing the right level of fee or
tax in a political environment. Twenty years ago it used to be necessary
to pledge to always oppose earmarked taxes in order to get a job at the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB model went like
this: The special interest groups backing projects--the construction
industry, unions, and users--would lobby for too high a tax or fee. They
would claim property rights to the proceeds and OMB would be helpless
to control the tied spending. This model developed because twenty
years ago gas tax proceeds were flooding in; they mostly had to be used
for new construction, and it appeared as though we would pave over
America. Ultimately, the OMB model proved wrong. OPEC indirectly
curbed the growth of gas tax revenues and the law was eventually
changed to divert some portion of the proceeds to maintenance and
mass transit. You can, again, talk about earmarking at OMB, but do not
let the old-timers overhear you. They still do not believe that anyone can
get it right.
If my remarks have a theme, it is to be careful out there. It is one
thing to document the existence of public investment opportunities that
promise a high social rate of return. It is quite another to design grant
and political decision-making systems that effectively target resources
on those opportunities. Most of us budgeteers thought that it was
something of a triumph to reduce public civilian investment in the late
seventies and early eighties. In one of his few successes, President
Carter was able to control water projects, but at great political cost. God
willing, we shall never build a Tombigbee Waterway again. Perhaps the
budgeteers were too successful, but I remain skeptical. It does not take
much encouragement for politicians to fund physical projects. They
provide identifiable jobs; you can start them with a ceremonial shovel;
and you can cut ribbons to open them--all on the nightly news. Again
I say, be careful out there.Discussion
James M. Poterba*
This paper suggests several substantial reforms in the financing
arrangements for public infrastructure spending. The general theme of
Edward Gramlich’s excellent and provocative paper is that greater
reliance should be placed on the price mechanism in funding and
allocating public goods, a position that is largely immune to attack from
other economists. Nevertheless, some of the author’s specific recom-
mendations are at least subject to debate. My remarks first develop the
general point that the financing mechanism used in providing public
goods can significantly affect the level of such outlays. The question
then is why closed-end matching grants are so popular despite their
limited marginal incentive effects. The final section includes several brief
comments on some of the particular reforms suggested here, notably
those for pricing sanitation services, higher education, and highway
utilization.
A central point to recognize in discussing reforms in infrastructure
finance is that financing mechanisms are not simply accounting conven-
tions. Rather, they directly affect the level of infrastructure spending.
Two examples illustrate this proposition. First, transitions from general
revenue financing to earmarked taxes affect the level of outlays. In a
detailed study of urban mass transit systems, Cromwell (1989) found
that transit workers in systems that adopted earmarked taxes received
real wage increases totaling 20 percent over the next five years. This
finding accords with claims that earmarking, by insulating the targeted
activity from annual budgetary pressures, permits greater outlays.
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Whether such increases in outlays are consistent with an optimal fiscal
program is unclear, but the results do suggest the power of earmarked
taxes to raise expenditures.
A second example concerns the role of state capital budgeting
techniques. Previous research by Bunch (1988) suggests that state debt
limits constrain capital outlays; those states with such debt limits have
lower levels of infrastructure spending. My own related research (Po-
terba 1990) on capital budgets suggests that states that distinguish
capital from current outlays in their budget process ultimately spend
approximately 15 percent more on capital than do states that combine
capital and non-capital outlays in a single budget. These results under-
score the role of fiscal institutions in affecting the outcome of public
good provision, and suggest the potential importance of funding re-
forms in changing the level of such spending.
One of the major themes of Gramlich’s paper is that closed-end
matching grants, which provide matching rates well above plausible
estimates of the marginal externalities from state and local infrastructure
spending, should be replaced with open-end grants with lower match-
ing rates. The pervasive nature of closed-end grants, however, suggests
either that strong political factors incline politicians against such a
change, or that some factors omitted from the standard efficiency
analysis may be operating. Probably the most important political factor
is the perceived need for equitable treatment of different jurisdictions.
Open-end grants admit the possibility that rich states or localities will
contribute several times as much as their poorer neighbors to the
matching programs. The absolute transfer between the federal govern-
ment and these jurisdictions will be larger than that to poorer jurisdic-
tions, exacerbating pre-existing inequities. It may also be politically
difficult for representatives of poorer jurisdictions to explain why much
larger federal transfers were received by communities other than their
own. These political considerations may be the principal reason for the
prevalence of closed-end grants.
Closed-end grants may also be justified by efficiency consider-
ations, a point widely recognized in various contexts in regulatory
economics. With no uncertainty regarding the response of localities to
subsidy programs, price and quantity schemes can be used interchange-
ably to encourage expenditures on particular activities. With uncer-
tainty, however, good reasons may be found for choosing one program
or the other. As Weitzman (1974) has argued, substantial uncertainty
regarding the price sensitivity of the regulated agents may leave the
regulator uncertain about the likely consequences of price-based
schemes. For example, if federal grant-givers envision a minimally
acceptable level of interstate highway in each jurisdiction, with rela-
tively small marginal benefits to additional highways beyond this level,244 James M. Poterba
then closed-end grants may be an optimal way to elicit desired local
behavior. High subsidy rates on expenditures up to some level ensure
that most jurisdictions will take advantage of programs to this point.
The possibility that closed-end grants are an efficient way to achieve
certain legislative objectives does not, of course, imply that these grants
are well designed or that the "kink" in the matching rate is at the
appropriate point. Nevertheless, the case for dismissing matching
grants is weaker than the conventional analysis might suggest.
One of the most appealing features of Gramlich’s paper is its blend
of general theory with particular applications, many of which provide
fertile opportunities for creative policy design. Each of these raises
intriguing issues in policy design. First, consider the potential of user
¯ charges in ameliorating the growing solid-waste crisis in the United
States. User fees undoubtedly can play an important role in encouraging
recycling, particularly if they are levied on products at the time of
purchase. User charges are more successful when levied on consumers
buying a good than when they apply to consumer disposal of a bad. This
is because fewer ways exist to avoid compliance with user charges for
goods (How many people rent four-wheel drive vehicles so they can
enter national parks without paying fees?) than with charges for
disposing of bads. User charges for waste disposal are particularly
problematic, since significant charges per can of trash may encourage
illegal dumping. The net effect--trash in public parks and dumping in
places where the environmental damages may significantly exceed those
in traditional landfills--may be quite contrary to that of standard user
charge models, which assume perfect compliance.
Another example of how user charges might be used concerns
higher education. The rapid increase in the rate of return to higher
education in the last decade suggests little need for direct state subsidies
to those who wish to attend college. Arguments may be made for
government assistance in relaxing liquidity constraints, coupled with
strengthened enforcement to avoid significant revenue costs.
The final area is the user fee for highway use. One issue this paper
does not address is the efficacy of imperfect user charges in targeting the
ultimate activity that must be taxed. Gasoline taxes, the standard user
charge for highways, illustrate these difficulties. Numerous studies have
documented that different vehicles cause different amounts of damage
on the interstate highway system, and that these marginal costs are not
particularly tied to gasoline consumption. The policy options for raising
user fees in this context therefore involve imperfections, a point that
must be recognized in policy design. This is not an argument against
user fees per se, but a call for further research on this intriguing aspect
of the problem.DISCUSSION 245
Gramlich’s paper is a refreshing examination of how capital outlays
should be financed. It raises a number of points that deserve central
attention in the policy arena, and suggests several avenues for future
research in public finance. In the austere budget environment of
Washington and the state capitals in the early 1990s, this paper’s
proposals for more efficient infrastructure finance, often with a positive
revenue yield, are sure to attract serious attention.
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